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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a two-country two-commodity dynamic model with free international asset 
trade in which one country achieves full employment and the other suffers long-run 
unemployment. Own and spill-over effects of changes in policy, technological and preference 
parameters that emerge through exchange-rate adjustment are examined. Parameter changes 
that worsen the stagnant country’s current account depreciate the home currency, expand home 
employment and improve the foreign terms of trade, making both countries better off. The 
stagnant country’s foreign aid to the fully employed country also yields the same beneficial 
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1. Introduction 
 In a closed economy, an increase in productivity obviously expands national income if full 
employment prevails. In a two-country setting it benefits not only the home country but also 
the foreign country because it lowers the relative price of the home commodity and improves 
the foreign country’s terms of trade. If the two countries suffer long-run economic stagnation 
due to aggregate demand deficiency, however, the result may be different. By extending the 
persistent stagnation model of Ono (1994, 2001) to a two-country framework, Ono (2006, 
2013) showed that in the presence of aggregate demand deficiency an increase in the home 
country’s productivity excessively improves the current account and leads the home currency 
to appreciate so much that home employment and consumption decrease. The home currency 
appreciation in turn causes the foreign country’s employment and national income to increase. 
Moreover, changes in policy, technical or preference parameters that stimulate home aggregate 
demand generally worsen the home current account and lead the home currency to depreciate, 
which reduces foreign employment and makes the foreign country worse off. Thus, an 
international asymmetry of business activities naturally arises. This is quite different from the 
standard result that holds under full employment in both countries.  
 There is another important case: one country faces persistent deficiency of aggregate 
demand while the other country realizes full employment. It may in particular be the case 
between a developed country that faces persistent stagnation, e.g. Japan, and an emerging 
country that has large demand and enjoys a boom, e.g. China. This paper treats this case and 
examines which of the two results mentioned above is true.  
 This analysis also applies to the effect of foreign aid. It is naturally believed that foreign 
aid makes the donor country worse off and the recipient country better off. Due to this belief 
the foreign aid budget is usually cut when a donor country faces persistent stagnation, as Japan 
did in the ‘Lost Decades’. However, this belief is true only if full employment prevails in both 
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countries. If both countries face stagnation, the donor country is better off while the recipient 
country is worse off as a result of exchange-rate adjustment (see Ono, 2013).1  
 The pros and cons of foreign aid in the asymmetric case were discussed in some important 
policy decisions. The Marshall Plan in 1947 was an example. George C. Marshall, the US 
Secretary of State at that time, proposed an aid of $20 billion to European countries that had 
significantly lost supply capacities in World War II and faced a serious shortage of supply. He 
insisted that it benefited not only European consumers by enabling them to import US 
commodities but also US producers and workers by creating a market.2 In the context of the 
North-South problem, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, a 
panel lead by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt in the early 1980s (the Brandt 
commission, 1980, 1983), argued that foreign aid from the North to the South would benefit the 
donors as well as the recipients through not only stabilizing political/security situations but also 
creating import demand and expanding employment in the North.3 This paper examines the 
validity of those statements and finds that foreign aid makes both the recipient country and the 
donor country better off if the former achieves full employment and the latter has persistent 
deficiency of aggregate demand.  
 It should be noted that the stagnation considered in the present analysis is not a temporary 
one but a persistent one that arises as a steady-state phenomenon. Most of the recent literature 
on macroeconomic fluctuations in an open-economy setting focuses on the analysis of 
                                                 
1 In the literature such a controversial case has been discussed as a transfer paradox. The paradox arises 
through not an expansion of employment but a change in the terms of trade with full employment. It arises only in 
the case of Walrasian instability, multiple equilibia or some distortions in a two-country case. See Bhagwati et al 
(1983, 1985) for a general analysis of the transfer paradox with distortions in static two-country and three-country 
frameworks. Polemarchakis (1983) extended it to an n-country economy. The paradoxical case in this paper arises 
through a change in employment. 
2 He stated: “The Marshall Plan, it should be noted, benefited the American economy as well. The money 
would be used to buy goods from the United States, and they had to be shipped across the Atlantic on American 
merchant vessels.” See Congressional Record, 30 June 1947. 
3 This issue was treated by Ono (2007) but he used CES utility functions. This paper extends that analysis to 
the case of general homothetic utility. 
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perturbations due to various policy and technology shocks in the neighborhood of the 
full-employment steady state. They are new open economy macroeconomic models (see an 
extensive survey of Lane, 2001) and extensions of DSGE models (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 
2003, 2007; Christiano et al., 2005) to a small open economy setting (e.g. Adolfson et al., 2007, 
2008). It may however be inadequate to apply these approaches to such long-run stagnation as 
Japan’s Lost Decades and maybe EU countries’ Great Recession triggered by the financial 
crisis of 2008. In the recent IMF annual conference, for example, Summers (2013) criticized 
too much reliance on the DSGE approach in solving economic crises and emphasized the need 
for researchers to work on long-run recessions rather than short-run business fluctuations. This 
paper follows this line of thought and considers a long-run stagnation model. 
 
2. The model 
 There are two countries, the home and foreign countries. The home production sector 
specializes in commodity 1 and the foreign one in commodity 2. Both of them use only labor to 
produce the commodities with constant productivity.  
 The household sectors of the two countries have the same utility function of the two 
commodities. The function is homothetic and hence for a given level of consumption 
expenditure 𝑐 (or 𝑐∗) the utility can be summarized as 
 𝑢(𝑐) ≡ 𝑢�(𝑐1, 𝑐2),   𝑢(𝑐∗) ≡ 𝑢�(𝑐1∗, 𝑐2∗) 
where 𝑐𝑖 (or 𝑐𝑖∗) is the consumption of commodity 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2) that satisfies 
  𝑝1(𝜔)𝑐1 = 𝛿(𝜔)𝑐,   𝑝2(𝜔)𝑐2 = [1 − 𝛿(𝜔)]𝑐, 
 𝑝1(𝜔)𝑐1∗ = 𝛿(𝜔)𝑐∗,   𝑝2(𝜔)𝑐2∗ = [1 − 𝛿(𝜔)]𝑐∗,   
  𝛿′(𝜔) > 0. (1) 
In the above expressions 𝜔 is the relative price and 𝑝𝑖(𝜔) is the real price of commodity 𝑖 
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(𝑖 = 1, 2): 
 𝑝1(𝜔) = 𝑃1𝑃 = 𝑃1∗𝑃∗,     𝑝2(𝜔) = 𝑃2𝑃 = 𝑃2∗𝑃∗ = 𝜔𝑝1(𝜔), (2) 
 𝑃1∗ = 𝑃1𝜖 ,   𝑃2 = 𝜖𝑃2∗. 
𝑃 and 𝑃∗  are the two countries’ general price indices, 𝑃𝑖  and 𝑃𝑖∗ are the home and foreign 
nominal prices of commodity 𝑖 measured in each currency, and 𝜖 is the nominal exchange rate, 
which satisfies 
 𝑃 = 𝜖𝑃∗. 
Because the time derivative of this equation gives 
 𝜋 = ?̇?
𝜖
+ 𝜋∗, 
where 𝜋 and 𝜋∗ are inflation rates, from the non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign 
assets whose nominal interest rates are respectively 𝑅 and 𝑅∗: 
 𝑅 = ?̇?
𝜖
+ 𝑅∗, 
one obtains 
 𝑅 − 𝜋 = 𝑟 = 𝑅∗ − 𝜋∗, (3) 
i.e, the real interest rate 𝑟 is internationally the same.  
 Because the home and foreign general price indices 𝑃 and 𝑃∗ satisfy  
 𝑑𝑃
𝑃
= 𝛿(𝜔) 𝑑𝑃1
𝑃1
+ (1 − 𝛿(𝜔)) 𝑑𝑃2
𝑃2
,   𝑑𝑃
∗
𝑃∗
= 𝛿(𝜔) 𝑑𝑃1∗
𝑃1
∗ + (1 − 𝛿(𝜔)) 𝑑𝑃2∗𝑃2∗ , 
as shown by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p.175), from (2) one finds 
 0 = 𝛿(𝜔) 𝑝1′ (𝜔)
𝑝1(𝜔) + (1 − 𝛿(𝜔)) 𝑝2′ (𝜔)𝑝2(𝜔), 
 1 + 𝜔𝑝1′
𝑝1
= 𝜔𝑝2′
𝑝2
. 
These two equations yield 
 𝛿 = 1 + 𝜔𝑝1′
𝑝1
= 𝜔𝑝2′
𝑝2
. (4)  
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 The home and foreign representative households have the same subjective discount rate 𝜌 
and the same liquidity preference 𝑣(∙). They maximize each utility functional:  
  ∫ [𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑚)]∞0 exp(−𝜌𝑡)𝑑𝑡,     ∫ [𝑢(𝑐∗) + 𝑣(𝑚∗)]∞0 exp(−𝜌𝑡) 𝑑𝑡,  
subject to each flow budget equation and asset constraint: 
 ?̇? = 𝑟𝑎 + 𝑤𝑥 − 𝑐 − 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑧,    ?̇?∗ = 𝑟𝑎∗ + 𝑤∗𝑥∗ − 𝑐∗ − 𝑅∗𝑚∗ − 𝑧∗, 
 𝑎 = 𝑚 + 𝑏,    𝑎∗ = 𝑚∗ + 𝑏∗, (5) 
where 𝑤  (or 𝑤∗ ) is the real wage, 𝑧  (or 𝑧∗ ) is the lump-sum tax, and 𝑥  (or 𝑥∗ ) is the 
employment. Real total assets 𝑎 (or 𝑎∗) consist of real money balances 𝑚 (or 𝑚∗) and foreign 
asset 𝑏 (or 𝑏∗). The firm value is zero under the linear technology. Real rate of interest 𝑟 is 
internationally the same, as shown by (3). The two countries’ labor endowments are 
normalized to 1 and may not be fully employed. Therefore, each country’s actual employment 
𝑥 (or 𝑥∗) implies each employment rate. 
 From the Hamiltonian function of each household’s optimization behavior: 
 𝐻 = 𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑚) +  𝜆(𝑟𝑎 + 𝑤𝑥 − 𝑐 − 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑧), 
  𝐻∗ = 𝑢(𝑐∗) + 𝑣(𝑚∗) +  𝜆∗(𝑟𝑎∗ + 𝑤∗𝑥∗ − 𝑐∗ − 𝑅∗𝑚∗ − 𝑧∗), 
one obtains the first-order optimal conditions:4 
  𝜆 = 𝑢′(𝑐),   𝜆𝑅 = 𝑣′(𝑚),    ?̇?
𝜆
= 𝜌 − 𝑟,   
 𝜆∗ = 𝑢′(𝑐∗),    𝜆∗𝑅∗ = 𝑣′(𝑚∗),   𝜆∗̇
𝜆∗
= 𝜌 − 𝑟. (6)  
From the Ramsey equations in (6), one finds 
 𝜆∗ = 𝜅𝜆,   𝜅 = constant over time. (7) 
From (3), (6) and (7), world total consumption C satisfies 
 𝐶 (=  𝑐 +  𝑐 ∗) =  𝑢′−1(𝜆) +  𝑢′−1(𝜅𝜆)   →  𝜆 =  𝜆(𝐶, 𝜅), 
                                                 
4  Apparently, by replacing 𝑢(𝑐)  by 𝑢�(𝑐1, 𝑐2)  one obtains the intratemporal and intertemporal optimal 
condiitons given by (1) and (6) all at once. 
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 �𝜆𝐶𝐶 
𝜆
�
?̇?
𝐶
= 𝜌 + 𝜋 − 𝑣′(𝑚)
𝑢′(𝑐) , (8) 
and 𝜆 satisfies 
 𝜆𝐶 
𝜆
= −1 �𝑐
𝜂
+ 𝑐∗
𝜂∗
�� < 0,    𝜅𝜆𝜅 
𝜆
= −�𝑐∗
𝜂∗
� �
𝑐
𝜂
+ 𝑐∗
𝜂∗
�� < 0,  (9) 
where 
 𝜂 = −𝑢′′(𝑐)𝑐
𝑢′(𝑐) ,    𝜂∗ = −𝑢′′(𝑐∗)𝑐∗𝑢′(𝑐∗) . 
 The home (or foreign) government imposes lump-sum tax 𝑧  (or 𝑧∗ ) and purchases 
commodity 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2) by the amount of 𝑔𝑖 (or 𝑔𝑖∗). Therefore, 
 𝑧 = 𝑝1(𝜔)𝑔1 + 𝑝2(𝜔)𝑔2,   𝑧∗ = 𝑝1(𝜔)𝑔1∗ + 𝑝2(𝜔)𝑔2∗. (10) 
 From the home and foreign demand functions presented by (1), the world demand for 
commodity 1 and that for commodity 2 are 𝛿(𝜔)𝐶/𝑝1(𝜔)  and [ 1 − 𝛿(𝜔)]𝐶/𝑝2(𝜔) , 
respectively. Commodity prices perfectly adjust in the international competitive market so that 
 𝛿(𝜔)
𝑝1(𝜔)𝐶 + 𝑔1 + 𝑔1∗ = 𝜃1𝑥,  
 1−𝛿(𝜔)
𝑝2(𝜔) 𝐶 + 𝑔2 + 𝑔2∗ = 𝜃2∗𝑥∗, (11) 
where 𝜃1 is the home productivity and 𝜃2∗ is the foreign productivity. Real balances 𝑚 and 𝑚∗ 
satisfy 
 𝑚 = 𝑀
𝑃
,    𝑚∗ = 𝑀∗
𝑃∗
, (12) 
where 𝑀 and 𝑀∗ are nominal money supplies and are assumed to be constant over time, for 
simplicity, but may increase in a once-and-for-all manner. Because the above equations yield 
 ?̇? = −𝜋𝑚,    ?̇?∗ = −𝜋∗𝑚∗, 
and 𝑧 and 𝑧∗ satisfy (10), the flow budget equations in (5) reduce to 
 ?̇? = 𝑟𝑏 + 𝑝1(𝜔)𝜃1𝑥 − 𝑐 − [𝑝1(𝜔)𝑔1 + 𝑝2(𝜔)𝑔2],   
 ?̇?∗ = 𝑟𝑏∗ + 𝑝2(𝜔)𝜃2∗𝑥∗ − 𝑐∗ − [𝑝1(𝜔)𝑔1∗ + 𝑝2(𝜔)𝑔2∗].  (13) 
Foreign assets 𝑏 and 𝑏∗ always satisfy 
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 𝑏 + 𝑏∗ = 0. (14) 
 
3. The condition for the asymmetric steady state to arise 
 This section presents the condition for the asymmetric case where the home country faces 
persistent unemployment while the foreign country achieves full employment to appear. If the 
economy is in steady state, 𝑐 and 𝑐∗ are constant and then from (6) and (12),  
 𝜌 = 𝑣′(𝑀/𝑃)
𝑢′(𝑐) ,     𝜌 = 𝑣′(𝑀∗/𝑃∗)𝑢′(𝑐∗) .  (15) 
Current accounts ?̇? and ?̇?∗ given in (13) are zero. Therefore, if both countries achieve full 
employment, i.e., 
  𝑥 = 1,   𝑥∗ = 1, 
from (11), (13) and (14), 𝑐, 𝑐∗ and 𝜔 satisfy  
 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑓 ≡ 𝜌𝑏 + 𝑝1(𝜔𝑓)𝜃1 − [𝑝1(𝜔𝑓)𝑔1 + 𝑝2(𝜔𝑓)𝑔2], 
 𝑐∗ = 𝑐𝑓∗ ≡ −𝜌𝑏 + 𝑝2(𝜔𝑓)𝜃2∗ − [𝑝1(𝜔𝑓)𝑔1∗ + 𝑝2(𝜔𝑓)𝑔2∗],  
 𝜔
𝑓𝛿�𝜔𝑓�
1−𝛿�𝜔𝑓�
= 𝜃1−𝑔1−𝑔1∗
𝜃2
∗−𝑔2−𝑔2
∗.  (16) 
Substituting these 𝑐 and 𝑐∗ into (15) gives the steady state levels of 𝑃 and 𝑃∗. 
 However, in the presence of a liquidity trap the above-mentioned steady state may not 
exist. In the present setting a liquidity trap emerges if the marginal utility of money 𝑣′(𝑚) has 
a positive lower bound 𝛽,5 
 lim𝑚→∞ 𝑣′(𝑚) = 𝛽 > 0, 
because the first two equations in (6) gives the home money demand function: 
                                                 
5  Ono (1994, 2001) assumes this property in a closed-economy setting and proves that the dynamic 
equilibrium path uniquely exists and converges to a steady state with persistent unemployment. The validity of 
this property is empirically shown by Ono, Ogawa and Yoshida (2003) using both a parametric and a 
non-parametric approach. 
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 𝑅 = 𝑣′(𝑚)
𝑢′(𝑐) (> 𝛽𝑢′(𝑐)   for any 𝑚), 
where 𝑅 stays strictly positive as 𝑚 increases, implying a liquidity trap. In this case, if and only 
if the home consumption under full employment 𝑐𝑓 is so large as to satisfy  
 𝜌 < 𝛽
𝑢′�𝑐𝑓�
�< 𝑣′(𝑀/𝑃)
𝑢′�𝑐𝑓�
   for any 𝑃�,  (17) 
there is no 𝑃 that satisfies the first equation in (15), implying that there is neither a steady state 
that accommodates full employment in the home country nor an equilibrium path that achieves 
full employment. Given that the left- and right-hand sides of (17) respectively represent the 
time preference rate and the liquidity premium, (17) shows the case where the marginal desire 
for holding money dominates that for consumption if this household consumes enough to 
realize full employment. The same argument applies to the foreign country. 
 If the home country has no steady state with full employment and the foreign country 
achieves full employment, (17) is valid in the home country while foreign consumption 𝑐∗ 
given in (16) satisfies 
 𝜌 > 𝛽
𝑢′(𝑐∗)  
so that there is 𝑃∗ that makes the second equation of (15) valid. From (16), (17) and the above 
inequality, the asymmetric case emerges when6 
 𝜌 < 𝛽
𝑢′�𝜌𝑏+𝑝1�𝜔𝑓�𝜃1−�𝑝1�𝜔𝑓�𝑔1+𝑝2�𝜔𝑓�𝑔2��
 ,  
 𝜌 > 𝛽
𝑢′�−𝜌𝑏+𝑝2�𝜔𝑓�𝜃2
∗−�𝑝1�𝜔𝑓�𝑔1
∗+𝑝2�𝜔𝑓�𝑔2
∗��
 ,  
or equivalently, 
 𝜌𝑏 > min(𝑢′−1 �𝛽
𝜌
� − 𝑝1(𝜔𝑓)(𝜃1 − 𝑔1) + 𝑝2(𝜔𝑓)𝑔2,   
 −𝑢′−1 �𝛽
𝜌
� − 𝑝1(𝜔𝑓)𝑔1∗ + 𝑝2(𝜔𝑓)(𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2∗)). (18) 
                                                 
6 Ono (2013) deals with the case where the first inequality is valid but the second one is opposite: neither 
country has a full-employment steady state. 
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This case holds when home productivity 𝜃1 is high while foreign productivity 𝜃2∗ is low, when 
home government purchases 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 are small while foreign government purchases 𝑔1∗ and 
𝑔2
∗ are large, and when the home country owns huge foreign assets (i.e., 𝑏 is large). In the 
following analysis we treat this case.  
 
4. Dynamics and local stability 
 In the asymmetric case there is no equilibrium path with full employment. In order to 
accommodate the possibility of persistent unemployment, sluggish wage adjustments must be 
introduced. Recent dominant settings of wage adjustments are the New Classical, the New 
Keynesian, and the hybrid Phillips curves. They well fit to analyze short-run fluctuations 
around the full-employment steady state, but does not to examine persistent stagnation because 
they are set up so that the inflation-deflation rate cumulatively expands as long as market 
disequilibrium exists.7 Thus, the possibility of unemployment in a steady state is intrinsically 
eliminated and thus under (17) no equilibrium path exists. In order for the unemployment 
steady state to be possible, a dynamic extension of Akerlof’s fair wage model (1982), presented 
by Ono and Ishida (2013), is adopted in the following analysis.8 
 In each country there are three kinds of workers, employed, unemployed and newly hired 
ones. Employed workers randomly separate from the current job at the Poison rate 𝛼 so that 
employment 𝑥 follows 
 ?̇? = −𝛼𝑥 + 𝜒,  (19)  
                                                 
7 See Woodford (2003) for properties of those Phillips curves. 
8 Ono and Ishida (2013) extended the fair-wage hypothesis a la Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
to a dynamic setting and proposed a microeconomic foundation of wage adjustment that converges to the 
conventional Walrasian one. That adjustment mechanism intrinsically eliminates neither unemployment nor full 
employment in the steady state.   
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where 𝜒 is the number of workers that are newly hired. While workers are employed, they form 
fair wage 𝑊𝐹 in mind by referring to their past wages, their fellow workers’ fair wages (which 
equal their own fair wages) and the unemployment situation of the society. More precisely, 
they first consider the rightful wage 𝜈, which is the wage that they believe fair if everybody is 
employed. Therefore, 𝜈(𝑡 − ∆𝑡), meaning the rightful wage that is ex post conceived at time 
𝑡 − ∆𝑡, is calculated so that the current fair wage 𝑊𝐹(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) equals the average of 𝜈(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) 
and the zero income of the unemployed. Because the number of the employed is 𝑥(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) and 
that of the unemployed is 1 − 𝑥(𝑡 − ∆𝑡), it satisfies 
 𝜈(𝑡 − ∆𝑡)𝑥(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) + 0 × [1 − 𝑥(𝑡 − ∆𝑡)] = 𝑊𝐹(𝑡 − ∆𝑡).  (20)  
Newly hired workers, in contrast, do not have any preconception about the fair wage and 
simply follow the employed workers’ conceptions. Therefore, when the employed workers 
calculate the fair wage 𝑊𝐹(𝑡) at time 𝑡, the total number of workers that they care is 1 −
𝜒(𝑡)∆𝑡 because the number of new comers is 𝜒(𝑡)∆𝑡. The rightful wage that they have in mind 
is the one that was ex post conceived at time 𝑡 − ∆𝑡, which is 𝜈(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) in (20), and the 
number of the employed workers is 𝑥(𝑡 − ∆𝑡)(1 − 𝛼∆𝑡). Thus, the fair wage 𝑊𝐹(𝑡) is formed 
to be: 
 𝑊𝐹(𝑡) = 𝜈(𝑡−∆𝑡)𝑥(𝑡−∆𝑡)(1−𝛼∆𝑡)1−𝜒(𝑡)∆𝑡 . 
From (20) and the above equation, one obtains 
 𝑊𝐹(𝑡)−𝑊𝐹(𝑡−∆𝑡)
∆𝑡
= 𝜒(𝑡)𝑊𝐹(𝑡) − 𝛼𝑊𝐹(𝑡 − ∆𝑡). 
Reducing ∆𝑡 to zero results in  
 ?̇?𝐹
𝑊𝐹
= 𝜒 − 𝛼.  (21)  
 In the presence of unemployment, the firm will set wage 𝑊 equal to fair wage 𝑊𝐹 because 
𝑊𝐹 is the lowest wage under which the employees properly work. In the home country the 
commodity price 𝑃1 adjusts to 𝑊𝐹 𝜃1⁄  since there is no commodity supply if 𝑃1 < 𝑊𝐹 𝜃1⁄  and 
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excess commodity supply if 𝑃1 > 𝑊𝐹 𝜃1⁄ . Under full employment, in contrast, the firm tries to 
pick out workers from rival firms to expand the market share by increasing 𝑊 from 𝑊𝐹 so long 
as the marginal profits are positive. Therefore, 𝑊 is higher than the fair wage 𝑊𝐹 that follows 
(21), and is equalized to 𝜃1𝑃1. The same argument is valid in the foreign country. 
 Note that each commodity price, 𝑃1 in the home country and 𝑃2∗ in the foreign country, 
follows the movement of the fair wage 𝑊𝐹 when there is unemployment and 𝑊 declines, and 
that 𝑊  follows the movement of each commodity price regardless of 𝑊𝐹  when full 
employment maintains and 𝑊 rises. Thus, anyway one has 
 𝑤 = 𝑊
𝑃1
= 𝜃1,   𝑤∗ = 𝑊∗𝑃2∗ = 𝜃2∗. (22) 
 In the following the asymmetric case represented by (18) is considered and then: 
 𝑥 < 1,    𝑥∗ = 1. 
Therefore, 𝑊 = 𝑊𝐹 that follows (21) in the home country while 𝑊∗ and 𝑃2∗ always adjust so 
that full employment maintains in the foreign country. Having such price and wage 
adjustments in mind, from (2), (4), the second equation of (11) in which 𝑥∗ = 1, (21) and (22), 
one obtains  
 ?̇?
𝑊
= ?̇?1
𝑃1
= 𝜋 − (1 − 𝛿) ?̇?
𝜔
= 𝜒 − 𝛼.   
 1−𝛿(𝜔)
𝑝2(𝜔) 𝐶 + 𝑔2 + 𝑔2∗ = 𝜃2∗. (23) 
Using (4), the time derivative of the first equation in (11) and that of the second equation in 
(23), one finds 
 ?̇?
𝜔
= � 1−𝛿
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝛿′𝜔� ?̇?𝐶 ,  
 ?̇? = � 𝐶
𝑝1𝜃1
�
?̇?
𝐶
 . (24) 
Equation (19), the first equation of (23) and the two equations of (24) give  
 𝜋 = 𝛼(𝑥 − 1) + � 𝐶
𝑝1𝜃1
+ (1−𝛿)2
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′� ?̇?𝐶 .  
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Note that the Poison rate of job separation 𝛼 represents the price adjustment speed around the 
steady state in which 𝐶 is constant and that 1/𝛼 denotes the average duration of employment. 
 Substituting 𝑥 obtained from the first equation of (11) into the above expression of 𝜋 and 
applying the result to 𝜋 in (8) leads to 
 � 𝐶
𝑝1𝜃1
+ (1−𝛿)2
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ − 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝜆 � ?̇?𝐶 = 𝑣′(𝑚)𝜆(𝐶,𝜅) − 𝜌 − 𝛼 � 𝛿(𝜔)𝑝1(𝜔)𝜃1 𝐶 + 𝑔1+𝑔1∗𝜃1 − 1�, (25) 
where 𝜔 is a function of only 𝐶 derived from the second equation of (23). From (1) and (9), the 
coefficient of  ?̇? 𝐶⁄  in (25) is positive. In the neighborhood of the steady state, deflation 
continues and 𝑣′(𝑚) sticks to 𝛽, and hence the dynamic equation given by (25) reduces to  
 � 𝐶
𝑝1𝜃1
+ (1−𝛿)2
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ − 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝜆 � ?̇?𝐶 = 𝛽𝜆(𝐶,𝜅) − 𝜌 − 𝛼 � 𝛿(𝜔)𝑝1(𝜔)𝜃1 𝐶 + 𝑔1+𝑔1∗𝜃1 − 1� ≡ ∆(𝐶, 𝜅). (26) 
 If 𝐶 takes the full employment level 𝐶𝑓 that leads the home country to full employment, 
the first equation of (11) turns to be 
 𝛿(𝜔)𝐶𝑓 + 𝑔1 + 𝑔1∗ = 𝑝1(𝜔)𝜃1. 
Therefore, from (6), (8) and (17),  
 𝜌 < 𝛽
𝑢′�𝑐𝑓�
= 𝛽
𝜆�𝐶𝑓,𝜅� , 
and ∆(𝐶, 𝜅) defined by (26) satisfies 
 ∆(𝐶𝑓, 𝜅) > 0.  
Therefore, in order for the steady-state level of 𝐶 to exist in the range of (0,𝐶𝑓), it must be 
valid that 
 ∆(0, 𝜅) < 0,  
Because (6), (7) and (8) imply that 𝑐 = 0  if 𝐶 = 0  for a given 𝜅 , 𝜆(0, 𝜅) = 𝑢′(0) = ∞ . 
Therefore, from (26), in the neighborhood where 𝑔1 + 𝑔1∗ = 0  the above condition is 
equivalent to 
 𝜌 − 𝛼 > 0.  (27)  
Figure 1 illustrates this case –i.e., 𝑅𝑚 is located above 𝜌 and (27) is valid.  
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 In this case ∆(𝐶, 𝜅) must be positively inclines as 𝐶 increases around the steady state, 
which is represented by E in the figure.  From (4), (9), the second equation of (23), and (26), 
this property is represented as follows: 
 ∆𝐶(𝐶, 𝜅) = � 𝛽𝜆(𝐶,𝜅)� �𝑐𝜂 + 𝑐∗𝜂∗�� − 𝛼𝑝1𝜃1 > 0. 
This property guarantees the uniqueness of equilibrium path in the dynamics of (26) because 𝐶 
is jumpable. Therefore, 𝐶 jumps to the level that satisfies  
 ∆(𝐶, 𝜅) = 0, 
and stays, once 𝜅 is given.  
 Moreover, from (6) and (7), 𝜅 must equal 𝑢′(𝑐∗)/𝑢′(𝑐) where 𝑐 and 𝑐∗ make ?̇? (= −?̇?∗) 
in (13) equal zero because otherwise ?̇? and −?̇?∗ continue to either expand or decline and the 
non-Ponzi game condition is violated. Therefore,  
 𝑢′(𝑐∗) = 𝜅𝑢′(𝑐), 
 𝑐 = 𝐶 − 𝑐∗, 
 𝑐∗ = −𝜌𝑏 + 𝑝2(𝜔)𝜃2∗ − [𝑝1(𝜔)𝑔1∗ + 𝑝2(𝜔)𝑔2∗], (28) 
where 𝜔 satisfies the second equation of (23). This 𝜅 depends on only 𝐶 besides exogenous 
parameters. Substituting it into (26) rewrites ∆(𝐶, 𝜅) to  
 ∅(𝐶;  𝛼,𝛽, 𝑏, 𝜃1,𝜃2∗,𝑔1,𝑔2,𝑔1∗,𝑔2∗) ≡ 𝛽𝜆(𝐶,𝜅) − 𝜌 − 𝛼 � 𝛿(𝜔)𝑝1(𝜔)𝜃1 𝐶 + 𝑔1+𝑔1∗𝜃1 − 1�, (29) 
where 𝜔  satisfies the second equation of (23). Making ∅  equal zero gives the complete 
solution of the steady-state level of 𝐶. Substituting this 𝐶 to the second equation of (23) gives 
𝜔, and hence from (28) 𝑐∗ and 𝑐 (= 𝐶 − 𝑐∗) obtain.  
 Let us finally prove that this steady state indeed exists in the neighborhood where 
 𝑔1 = 𝑔1∗ = 0,   𝑔2 = 𝑔2∗ = 0. (30) 
From (4), the second equation of (23) and the second and third equations of (28), one obtains 
 𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝐶
= 𝛿2(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ > 0, 
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i.e., the steady-state level of 𝑐 is larger as 𝐶 increases. If 𝐶 is small enough to make 𝑐 equal 
zero, 𝐶 = 𝑐∗ and 𝜆 = 𝑢′(0) = ∞. Thus, under (27) ∅ given by (29) satisfies  
 ∅(𝑐∗; … ) = −𝜌 − 𝛼 � 𝛿(𝜔)𝑐∗
𝑝1(𝜔)𝜃1 − 1� < 0. 
If 𝐶 is so large as to make 𝑐 equal the full-employment level 𝑐𝑓, 𝐶 = 𝐶𝑓 and then from the first 
equation of (11) in which 𝑥 = 1, the third term of the right-hand side of (29) is zero. Thus, from 
(17) ∅ given by (29) satisfies 
 ∅�𝐶𝑓; … � = 𝛽𝑢′�𝑐𝑓� − 𝜌 > 0.  
These two properties guarantees the existence of 𝐶 that makes ∅ equal zero and 𝑐 locate within 
(0, 𝑐𝑓). It also implies that around the steady state level of 𝐶 
 ∅𝐶(𝐶; … ) > 0. (31) 
 
5. Own and spillover effects of policy and parameter changes 
 This section analyzes the effects on 𝐶, 𝑐 and 𝑐∗ of changes in various policy, technological 
and preference parameters. As shown in the previous section, after those parameters change, 
the new steady state is immediately reached. Therefore, one can obtain the effects on 𝑐 and 𝑐∗ 
of changes in the parameters by ignoring the transitional process and simply calculating the 
effects on their steady-state levels. In order for such adjustment to emerge, it is assumed that 
the world economy is initially in the asymmetric steady state and that the foreign monetary 
authority, if necessary, increases the money stock in a once-and-for-all manner to avoid even 
short-run unemployment. The home monetary authority does not change the money stock 
because the home country is in the unemployment steady state, where a monetary expansion 
has no effect.  
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 From (4), (9), (29) to which 𝜔 in the second equation of (23) and 𝜅 in (28) are applied, and 
(31), in the neighborhood of (30) one obtains  
 ∅𝐶𝑑𝐶 = − ∅𝛼𝑑𝛼 − ∅𝛽𝑑𝛽 − ∅𝑏𝑑𝑏 − ∅𝑔1𝑑𝑔1 − ∅𝑔2𝑑𝑔2 −  ∅𝜃1𝑑𝜃1 
 − ∅𝑔1∗𝑑𝑔1∗ − ∅𝜃2∗−𝑔2∗𝑑(𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2∗), 
 ∅𝐶 = �𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� 𝛿2(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ − 𝛼𝑝1𝜃1 > 0, 
 ∅𝛼 = 1 − 𝑥 > 0,     ∅𝛽 = 1𝜆 > 0,    ∅𝑏 = 𝜌 �𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� > 0, 
 ∅𝑔1 = − 𝛼𝜃1 < 0,    ∅𝑔2 = −�𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� 𝑝2𝛿(1−𝛿)𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ − 𝛼𝜔𝜃1 < 0,    ∅𝜃1 = 𝛼𝑥𝜃1 > 0, 
 ∅𝑔1∗ = �𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� 𝑝1 − 𝛼𝜃1 > 0,    ∅𝜃2∗−𝑔2∗ = −𝑝2 ��𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� 𝜔𝛿′𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ − 𝛼𝑝1𝜃1�, (32) 
and 
 ∅𝐶𝑑𝑐 = − 𝜌𝛼𝑝1𝜃1 𝑑𝑏 − 𝛿2(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ �∅𝛼𝑑𝛼 + ∅𝛽𝑑𝛽 + ∅𝑔1𝑑𝑔1 + ∅𝜃1𝑑𝜃1� 
 + � 𝛼
𝑝1𝜃1
�
𝛿�1−𝛿2�+𝜔𝛿′
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ 𝑝2𝑑𝑔2 − �𝛼𝜃1� 𝛿(1−𝛿)2𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ 𝑑𝑔1∗ 
 −� 𝛼
𝑝1𝜃1
�
𝛿2(1−𝛿)
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ 𝑝2𝑑(𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2∗), 
 ∅𝐶𝑑𝑐∗ = −𝜌��𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� − 𝛼𝑝1𝜃1�𝑑𝑏 − 𝛿(1−𝛿)2𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ �∅𝛼𝑑𝛼 + ∅𝛽𝑑𝛽 + ∅𝑔1𝑑𝑔1 + ∅𝜃1𝑑𝜃1� 
 + � 𝛿(1−𝛿)
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′� ��𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� − 𝛿𝛼𝑝1𝜃1� 𝑝2𝑑𝑔2 − �𝑝1∅𝐶 + 𝛿(1−𝛿)2𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ ∅𝑔1∗ � 𝑑𝑔1∗  
 + ��𝜂
𝑐
� �
𝛽
𝜆
�
𝜔𝛿′
𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ − � 𝛼𝑝1𝜃1� 𝛿(1−𝛿)2+𝜔𝛿′𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ � 𝑝2𝑑(𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2∗). (33) 
Therefore,  
 𝛼 ↓, 𝛽 ↓, 𝑏 ↓, 𝑔1 ↑, 𝑔2 ↑, 𝜃1 ↓, 𝑔1∗ ↓   ⇒  𝐶 ↑ ,   𝑐 ↑ ,   𝑐∗ ↑, 
 𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2∗ ↑   ⇒  𝑐 ↓ ,   𝑐∗ ↑↓ ,   𝐶 ↑↓.  (34) 
 From the second equation of (23),  
 𝑑𝜔 = 𝜔𝐶𝑑𝐶 + 𝜔𝜃2∗−𝑔2−𝑔2∗𝑑(𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2 − 𝑔2∗), 
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 �𝐶
𝜔
�𝜔𝐶 = 1−𝛿𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ > 0,   �𝐶𝜔�𝜔𝜃2∗−𝑔2−𝑔2∗ = − 𝑝2𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′ < 0. 
From (32) and the above equations, the effect on 𝜔 of a change in 𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2∗ is  
 �𝐶∅𝐶
𝜔
�
𝑑𝜔
𝑑(𝜃2∗−𝑔2∗) = −� 𝛿𝑝2𝛿(1−𝛿)+𝜔𝛿′� ��𝜂𝑐� �𝛽𝜆� − 𝛼𝑝1𝜃1� < 0.  
These properties and (33) give 
 𝛼 ↓, 𝛽 ↓, 𝑏 ↓, 𝑔1 ↑, 𝑔2 ↑, 𝜃1 ↓, 𝑔1∗ ↓, 𝜃2∗ − 𝑔2∗ ↓   ⇒   𝜔 ↑. (35) 
 Let us discuss the implication of the main results summarized in (34) and (35). When the 
home country suffers persistent unemployment, a decrease in the Poison rate of job separation 
(or the price adjustment speed) 𝛼 alleviates deflation in the home country. Therefore, it makes 
more advantageous for households to consume than to hold money and home consumption is 
stimulated. Consequently, the current account worsens and the home currency depreciates, 
which improves the competitiveness of home firms and expands employment, further 
alleviating deflation. The home-currency depreciation in turn improves the terms of trade for 
the foreign country and makes it better off in the case where full employment prevails in the 
foreign country.  
 A decrease in the liquidity preference parameter 𝛽 yields the same effects on the two 
countries because it stimulates home consumption and moderates deflation. An expansion in 
home government purchases on the home commodity 𝑔1 creates new home employment and 
reduces the deflationary gap. Therefore, the same positive effects emerge. An improvement in 
home productivity 𝜃1, in contrast, widens the deflationary gap and hence the opposite effects 
arise in both countries. Home employment shrinks so much as to dominate the initial 
improvement in 𝜃1 and the foreign terms of trade worsens, which makes both countries worse 
off. 
 A transfer from the home country to the foreign country worsens the home foreign-asset 
position and thereby decreases the home current account. It causes the home currency to 
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depreciate and increases home production, employment and consumption. Consequently, the 
home country is better off. The foreign country is also better off because it not only receives the 
transfer but also benefits from the improvement in the terms of trade. This result may be 
consistent with that of the Marshall Plan and the statement of the Brandt commission, both 
mentioned in the introduction. 
 The above argument implies that a parameter or policy change that worsens the home 
current account generally depreciates the home currency, stimulates home production and 
employment, mitigates deflation and hence stimulates consumption. An expansion in home 
government purchases on the foreign commodity 𝑔2 is another example. It worsens the home 
current account, causes the home currency to depreciate, and yields the positive effects on the 
two countries.  
 An increase in foreign government purchases on the foreign commodity raises the relative 
price of the foreign commodity, which expands home employment and stimulates home 
consumption. The rise in the foreign commodity price benefits the foreign country. However, it 
is caused by an increase in foreign government purchases on the foreign commodity, which 
harms the foreign country. Therefore, the welfare effect on the foreign households is 
ambiguous. The effect of an increase in 𝜃2∗ is just the opposite to that of an increase in foreign 
government purchases on the foreign commodity. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 A two-country economy in which the home country suffers persistent unemployment due 
to aggregate demand deficiency while the foreign country realizes full employment is 
considered. The stagnant country often attempts to improve production efficiency, expecting 
that such an effort would expand the world market share of home commodities and increase 
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national income. However, it improves the current account and thereby appreciates the home 
currency. In the presence of aggregate demand deficiency the appreciation of the home 
currency is so high that employment eventually decreases and national income and 
consumption decline, making the home country worse off. It also worsens the foreign terms of 
trade and harms the foreign country if the foreign country achieves full employment.   
 In contrast, the home country’s changes in policy and preference parameters that worsen 
the home current account cause the home currency to depreciate and thereby expand 
employment and consumption. It also improves the foreign terms of trade and makes the 
foreign country better off. Typical examples are expansions of home government purchases on 
home and foreign commodities.  
 Foreign aid may be another important example. Foreign aid expenditures tend to be cut 
when a donor country suffers long-run stagnation. However, an expansion in foreign aid in fact 
makes the country better off because it worsens the home current account, depreciates the 
home currency, stimulates business, increases home employment, decreases deflation, and 
urges people to consume more. Moreover, if the recipient country is fully employed, it is also 
better off because it not only receives foreign aid but also benefits from the improvement in the 
terms of trade. 
 19 
References 
Adolfson M., S. Laséen, J. Lindé and M. Villani (2007) “Bayesian Estimation of an Open 
Economy DSGE Model with Incomplete Pass-through”, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 72, pp. 481-511.  
——, ——, —— and —— (2008) “Evaluating an Estimated New Keynesian Small Open 
Economy Model”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 32, pp. 2690-2721.   
Akerlof, G. A. (1982) “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 97, pp. 543-569. 
—— and J. L. Yellen (1990) “The Fair-Wage Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, pp. 255-284. 
Bhagwati, J. N., R. A. Brecher and T. Hatta  (1983) “The Generalized Theory of Transfers and 
Welfare: Bilateral Transfers in a Multilateral World”, American Economic Review, Vol. 
73, pp. 606-618. 
——, —— and —— (1983) “The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare: Exogenous 
(Policy-Imposed) and Endogenous (Transfer-Induced) Distortions”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 100, 697-714. 
Blanchard, O. J. and Fischer, S. (1989) Lectures on Macroeconomics, Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press. 
Brandt Commission (1980) North-South: A Programme for Survival, London: Pan Books 
—— (1983) Common Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery, Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evance (2005), “Nominal 
Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 113, pp. 1-45. 
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1980) Economics and Consumer Behavior, Cambridge: 
 20 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lane, P. R. (2001), “The New Open Economy Macroeconomics: A Survey”, Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 54, pp. 235-66. 
Ono, Y. (1994) Money, Interest, and Stagnation, Oxford University Press. 
—— (2001), “A Reinterpretation of Chapter 17 of Keynes’s General Theory: Effective 
Demand Shortage under Dynamic Optimization”, International Economic Review, Vol. 
42, pp. 207-236. 
—— (2006), “International Asymmetry in Business Activity and Appreciation of a Stagnant 
Country's Currency”, Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 57, pp. 101-120. 
—— (2007), “International Transfer under Stagnation”, in Theory and Practice of Foreign 
Aid, ed. by S. Lahiri, Elsevier: Amsterdam, pp. 155-171. 
—— (2013), “International Economic Interdependence and Exchange-rate Adjustment under 
Persistent Stagnation”, Japanese Economic Review, forthcoming, published online, 
doi:10.1111/jere.12012. 
—— and J. Ishida (2013), “On Persistent Demand Shortages: A Behavioral Approach”, 
Japanese Economic Review, forthcoming, published online, doi:10.1111/ jere.12016. 
——, K. Ogawa and A. Yoshida (2004), “Liquidity Preference and Persistent Unemployment 
with Dynamic Optimizing Agents”, Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 55, pp. 355-371.  
Polemarchakis, H. M. (1983) “On the Transfer Paradox”, International Economic Review, Vol. 
24, No. 3, pp. 749-760. 
Smets, F., and R. Wouters (2003), “An Estimated Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium 
Model of the Euro Area”, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, pp. 
1123-1175. 
—— and —— (2007), “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE 
Approach”, American Economic Review, Vol. 97, pp. 586-606. 
 21 
Summers, L. (2013) “14th Annual IMF Research Conference: Crises Yesterday and Today, 
Nov. 8, 2013” available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYpVzBbQIX0. 
Woodford, M. (2003) Interest and Prices, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
  
 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅 = 𝛽
𝜆(𝐶, 𝜅) 
𝑅 = 𝜌 + 𝛼 � 𝛿(𝜔)
𝑝1(𝜔)𝜃1 𝐶 − 1� 
𝑅 
𝑅𝑚 
𝜌 
𝜌 − 𝛼 
E 
𝐶 
O 𝐶𝑓 
Figure 1: Unemployment steady state 
